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1. Introduction 
This article analyses the effects of changing Europeanization pressures over minority activism. We look at 
the ways in which minority political actors interpreted the changing relevance of European organizations 
for minority policy-making and how they responded to it. Through a combined quantitative–qualitative 
approach, we trace the trajectory of minority attitudes to European institutions in Estonia and Latvia before 
and after 2004 (when these countries joined the EU and NATO), and then explore the ways in which 
minority activists interpreted these changes. We conclude that minority activists do not any longer have 
great expectations that international organizations will be able to “do something” about minority issues, 
such as that of non-citizenship. Meanwhile, European institutions remain relevant (in perhaps unintended 
ways), as minority activists use both European values and principles, and European-level lobbying as 
domestic tools to put pressure on their own governments, not least by trying to “shame” them internationally. 
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In a social climate of increasing minority distrust towards European institutions, it is perhaps surprising 
that minority activists have not considerably changed their repertoire of actions involving European 
institutions lobbying. However, we find that their motivations, expectations and ultimately the content (if 
not the form) of their actions has changed significantly. Minority activists’ approach to European 
institutions is now increasingly grounded in a pragmatic understanding of the limit of European institutions’ 
capacity (and willingness) for intervention on behalf of minorities, what we call “critical trust”. 
Much of the debate on the effects of Europeanization on minority policies in new member states has 
focused on the top-down effects of European pressures over minority politics, in particular on European 
institutions’ effectiveness in ensuring compliance and determining minority policies before and after 
accession. While this top-down approach has been arguably dominant, another strand in the literature has 
looked at the indirect effects of Europeanization, especially through processes of socialization. This article 
builds on this second strand of Europeanization literature, in that it focuses not on the agency of European 
institutions but on the agency of domestic political actors, positing European institutions as part of the 
existing political opportunity structures. From this perspective, EU accession can be understood as a change 
in the political opportunity structures for both majority and minority political actors. While attention has 
typically been on the impact of Europeanization over majority elites, we shift the focus to the minorities. 
By focusing on the minority actors, we show how minorities — rather than being passive objects of policy 
— actively adapt and respond to the changing dynamics of international pressures. 
 Estonia and Latvia present two interesting cases for our analysis. In both countries, before EU 
accession the external pressures of Europeanization entered into conflict with domestic pressures of state-
building and minority exclusion. Indeed, the political doctrines of Estonia and Latvia after they regained 
independence advocated legal restoration of the countries’ status before the Soviet occupation, 
underpinning exclusionary policies towards the sizeable Russian-speaking minorities that had settled in 
these countries mostly during Soviet times (Pettai and Kallas 2009; Mole 2012). The citizenship policies, 
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which left a majority of Russian-speakers without citizenship – creating the peculiar status of “non-
citizenship” – were particularly problematic, as they deprived a large portion of the minority population of 
basic political rights, at a time in which the main state-building decisions in Estonia and Latvia were being 
made (Järve 2009; Krūma 2009).1 This confirmed the ownership of the state by the “titular” nations and 
meant that the ethnic Estonian and Latvian elites entrenched themselves in all the major positions in the 
state.  
The potential tensions deriving from this situation meant that, in the years before EU accession, 
majority–minority relations became a priority for European institutions’ pressures on the Estonian and 
Latvian governments. However, pressures on these issues significantly diminished after accession, 
notwithstanding the fact that minority grievances – in particular regarding the persistence of non-citizenship 
– remain high. The downward trajectory of European pressures on minority issues and the persistence of 
strong minority grievances make Estonia and Latvia particularly illustrative cases of how changes in 
European pressures are received by minorities and influence their political activism. 
In this study, we make use of a combined quantitative–qualitative approach to better understand 
Russophone minorities’ changing perceptions of European institutions, and what that means for minority 
activism. This mixed method was chosen in order to take advantage of the strengths of both quantitative 
and qualitative methods and offset some of their respective weaknesses (Lieberman 2005; George and 
Bennett 2005; Fearon and Laitin 2008). The quantitative element of our research allows us to identify 
general trends and empirical regularities in minority attitudes towards European institutions; the qualitative 
element builds on semi-structured interviews with minority activists in order to understand the causal 
mechanism and rationale behind such trends and regularities. The quantitative analysis on the Russian-
speaking minorities’ perception of European institutions reveals a seeming contradiction: trust for European 
institutions has significantly declined among Russian-speakers after accession but at the same time a 
                                                   
1 The portion of Russian-speakers who acquired citizenship by birth upon independence was an estimated 20% in Estonia 
and 40% in Latvia (Mole 2012, 88; Smith, Galbreath, and Swain 2010, 119). 
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correlation emerges between minority political activism and trust in European institutions.  
The interviews help us make sense of our statistical findings. Ten members of prominent Estonian 
and Latvian civil society minority organizations were selected as interviewees. Among other questions 
related to their aims and strategies, the activists were asked to evaluate the importance of European 
institutions in pushing forth their minority rights agenda. Interviewees were chosen from all the most 
relevant minority grassroots organizations in order to present a comprehensive picture of how the most 
politically active members in the Russian-speaking communities interpret the role of European institutions, 
define their expectations vis-à-vis them, and strategically respond to these evaluations and expectations.  
Our qualitative analysis makes sense of the puzzle posed by the statistical findings: what the 
quantitative data show as higher trust for European institutions among minority activists is in fact revealed 
as a rather critical (and perhaps even cynical) form of trust. Our findings suggest that minority activists 
responded to what they perceived as the European institutions’ betrayal of initial promises on minority 
rights. They did so not by abandoning the European arena, but by shifting the way they understand such 
arena. Starting from an attitude of critical trust, minority activists do not expect European institutions to 
intervene directly on their behalf, but try to use the resonance of the European arena to shame their own 
governments.2  
 
2. Europeanization and Minority Activism 
Much of the debate on the effects of Europeanization on new member states with regard to minorities has 
been concerned with European institutions’ effectiveness in pushing for liberal, minority-friendly policies, 
in keeping with European norms on minority rights. On the one side of this debate, scholars found that the 
top-down influence from European institutions (EU, Council of Europe, and OSCE), especially when linked 
                                                   
2 Of course, whether this is actually effective is a moot point and is beyond the scope of this article. In fact, in a context of 
political marginalization, arguably few minority actions are effective. What is important here is how minority activists 
perceive Europeanization and how they react to changing circumstances.  
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to accession conditionalities, played a fundamental role in softening new member states’ attitudes towards 
minorities and at least partially liberalizing minority policies (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004; 
Kelley 2004; Vachudova 2005). On the other side, several authors have questioned whether the impact of 
international pressures — arguably effective on economic policies — also extends to minority policies and 
inter-ethnic relations (Agarin and Brosig 2009; Galbreath and McEvoy 2012). Others showed that the 
liberalizing effects of Europeanization pressures did not extend much beyond formal compliance, and that 
European-led policy changes did not have long-lasting effects after EU accession, when European 
institutions lost their main bargaining chip and their direct impact on these issues greatly diminished 
(Agarin and Regelmann 2012; Sasse 2008; Schulze 2010). 
While they come to different conclusions as to Europeanization’s effectiveness in determining 
minority policies, both sides to the compliance debate have been primarily interested in how governments 
responded to international pressures and, consequently, have treated minorities as objects of policy rather 
than political actors in their own right. In the resulting depictions, policymaking on minority issues appears 
as a bargaining process between international institutions on the one side and domestic majority elites on 
the other, with little or no input from minority actors. While this debate has been crucial in advancing our 
understanding of the effectiveness of top-down Europeanization in new member states, it is important to 
complement it with a deeper insight on the direct and (perhaps most importantly) indirect ways in which 
Europeanization has influenced minority political actors. This is particularly important in post-accession 
countries, where direct influence from European institutions on minority issues has significantly decreased 
(if not ceased).  
The role of European institutions in processes of Europeanization is often understood as direct: 
European institutions actively engage in pressuring, advising, and bargaining with political actors in new 
member states in order to promote specific policies. Much of the literature – including that on minority 
rights in new member states – has been concerned with this direct aspect of Europeanization. However, the 
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effects of Europeanization can also be indirect. In this wider sense, Europeanization does not happen only 
as a result of European institutions’ deliberate acts of “coercion, conditionality, socialisation, and persuasion” 
but can also happen indirectly “through normative emulation, lesson-drawing, and competition” (Börzel 
and Risse 2012, 3). More broadly, the very presence of European institutions and of the European political 
arena can create expectations among domestic political actors that then indirectly transform their incentives 
and disincentives, strategies and possibly even political outlook. 
A strand of the literature on Europeanization that has been more interested in indirect effects has 
been that on European socialization. In particular, European socialization has been understood as bringing 
about value changes through processes of bargaining, emulation, reinforcement and internalization of 
norms (Beyers 2010; Schimmelfennig, Engert, and Knobel 2006; Schimmelfennig 2005; Checkel 2005). 
Socialization does include direct efforts by European institutions to “teach” norms, but it is mostly based 
on the indirect effects of repeated interactions on actors’ values and preferences. Compared to the 
compliance literature, socialization literature has widened the focus from Europeanization’s policy 
outcomes to its broader political outcomes; from how legislations have (or have not) been adapted to 
European norms, to how actors have (or have not) changed as a result of their contacts with European norms 
and institutions. This shift showed that Europeanization can have broad (and even unintended) effects, as 
European norms and structures are not simply received passively by domestic actors, but go through “active 
processes of adaptation, change, interpretation, and resistance” on the part of the recipients (Börzel and 
Risse 2012, 8). This literature highlighted how Europeanisation is therefore not only a top-down process, 
but also a bottom-up one, that sees domestic actors actively engaging with European institutions, 
responding to European norms and constraints, and using the structural and discursive resources offered by 
the European political arena (McCauley 2011, 1021–1022; Spirova 2012). 
While this growing body of literature has advanced our understanding of the indirect effects of 
European institutions, once again its predominant focus has been on majority elites. Since majority elites 
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hold institutional positions that put them in closer contact with European institutions, studies that have tried 
to understand the extent to which repeated contacts have triggered processes of socialization and 
internalization of European norms – including on minority rights (e.g. Schimmelfennig, Engert, and Knobel 
2006; Kelley 2004) – have mostly concentrated on majority actors. Minority actors have once again 
remained marginal. 
The literature on social mobilization has had a clearer focus on non-elite actors (including 
minorities) and has also engaged with the role of the international arena. For instance, Sikkink (2005, 152–
159) argues that – when their domestic opportunity structures are repressed or blocked – contentious 
movements can campaign against their state by using the opportunities offered by international institutions, 
especially seeking out international allies to put pressure on their governments. Other authors have referred 
to a “boomerang effect” (Keck and Sikkink 1998), “scale shift” (Tarrow and McAdam 2005), or 
“externalization” (Della Porta and Tarrow 2005) when social movements target international organizations 
“in attempts to put pressure on their own governments for material or symbolic resources” (Della Porta and 
Tarrow 2005, 5). In this sense, international organizations become part of the political opportunity structures 
for social mobilization.  
While a thorough account of the debate on political opportunity structures is outside of the scope 
of this article, it is important to note here that distinctions have been made between the institutional and 
cultural dimensions of such structures (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996), or the “structural” model and 
“signal” model of opportunities (Meyer and Minkoff 2004, 1464). In other words, there is a difference 
between actual changes in opportunities (for example EU accession and the consequent retreat of European 
institutions from minority rights bargaining) and the wider signals activists receive from the political system. 
In the case of European minority activists, these “signals” could be understood as the prominence of 
minority rights discourses as part of European socialization and what is understood as European values. 
Both structural and cultural (“signals”) dimensions must be taken into account to understand the 
8 
 
environment minority activists operate within and the ways in which they respond to it. 
This article builds upon the existing literature on Europeanization, and in particular on its indirect 
socialization effects, but shifts the focus of attention from majority elites to minority communities and 
minority political activists. In so doing, it aims to explore the effects on minority mobilization of the 
changing levels of European pressures on minority rights in new member states. It also builds upon social 
mobilization literature, borrowing its multi-dimensional understanding of political opportunity structures. 
The starting point of our enquiry is the widely recognized diminished centrality of European institutions in 
directing new member states’ minority policies after accession (that is, reduced structural opportunities at 
the European level). Taking stock of these changed circumstances, our interest lays not so much with the 
actions minority actors put in place, as these are expected to be contingent upon domestic factors such as 
the structures of minority communities and their human, economic and social resources. Rather, we are 
interested in understanding how minorities have interpreted the changing external opportunity structures 
(both structures and signals) after EU accession, and whether minority activists have reacted to it by 
changing their understanding of European institutions as an arena for mobilization. 
 
3. The Changing Perceptions of European Institutions among 
Russophone Minorities 
The centrality of European institutions in the post-independence political development of the Baltic States 
has had multiple and at times contradictory implications for majority and minority communities alike. On 
the one hand, the progress of European integration of the Baltic republics diluted their political and 
economic ties with their Eastern neighbor state, placing these countries safely “back to Europe”. At the 
same time, European integration also came with a host of organizations pressuring the Estonian and Latvian 
governments to ease up their ethnocentric citizenship, language, and educational policies. Therefore, for 
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majority communities the value attached to “returning” to Europe came together with (European) minority 
rights norms that were at odds with their countries’ early nationalizing policies. For minority communities, 
Europeanization came with the promise of increased minority rights but also with the need to redefine their 
identities away from Russia. These different ambivalent feelings towards European integration can be 
expected to play a role in majority and minority’s attitudes and trust towards European institutions. 
In her study of trust in European institutions, Piret Ehin (2001) found no correlation between 
ethnicity and the evaluation of European institutions in the Baltic States, based on surveys conducted at a 
single point in time (in 1997). However, if we extend the observation over a longer time, we find that 
minorities and majorities’ opinions about European institutions followed significantly different trajectories. 
Majority communities’ opinions tended to improve over time. Russophone minorities, instead, initially had 
a more positive evaluation of European institutions than the “titular nations”, but subsequently became 
disillusioned and showed a more skeptical attitude towards European institutions than ethnic Estonians and 
Latvians in the 2000s.3  
Figure 1 demonstrates the inter-temporal fluctuation of the proportion of majority and minority 
respondents who evaluate the EU positively. As the figures show, from the 1990s to the early 2000s, 
Russophone minorities tended to evaluate the EU more positively than ethnic Estonians and Latvians. Then, 
their positive attitude and trust for the EU decreased over time. Finally, after the mid-2000s, when Estonia 
and Latvia completed EU accession, positive evaluation from the Baltic “titulars” surpassed the level of 
their Russophone counterparts. There is little difference in the general trend between Estonia and Latvia: 
Russian-speakers’ trust for the EU was initially high before decreasing and sinking below that of Baltic 
                                                   
3  For the estimation, we use the Central Eastern Eurobarometer (CEEB), the Candidate Countries Eurobarometer (CCEB), 
and the Eurobarometer (EB) in combination. They continue to provide the information about respondents’ language choice 
in only a few countries, including Estonia and Latvia. This makes it possible for us to distinguish between majorities’ and 
minorities’ intertemporal change of trust towards European institution. Although these barometers have partial differences 
between their questionnaires, they share basic components and methods, and taken together can provide a good 
approximation of a consistent social survey. The CEEB asked respondents for their impressions on the EU, providing them 
with three options; Positive, Neutral, and Negative. The CCEB and the EB asked respondents about their trust in the EU, 
with three options; Tending to trust, No opinion, and Tending not to trust.  
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“titulars”. 
 
Figure 1. Change of European Trust by Ethnic Groups in Estonia and Latvia 
 
Estonia 
 
Latvia 
 
Sources: CEEB2, 3, 6; CCEB 2001, 2002; EB 62.0–80.1 
 
These opposed trends in majorities and minorities’ perception of European institutions reflect the 
different expectations and fears that Russophone and “titular” communities had before EU accession and 
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institutions and the international recommendations that the Estonian and Latvian governments liberalize 
their minority policies encountered an ambivalent response among the national elites and the “titular” 
populations. On the one hand, pressures from international organizations were felt strongly by the Estonian 
and Latvian elites, who had enthusiastically adopted the rhetoric of the return to Europe (Smith 2003, 9). 
Joining the EU and NATO was framed as the obvious continuation of the independence struggle, putting 
Estonia and Latvia safely within the European community of nations and away from Russia. On the other 
hand, however, the European demands contradicted the restorationist and ethnocentric discourses that had 
prevailed after independence, and were therefore also perceived as a threat to “titular” identity preservation 
(Schulze 2010, 374). European institutions were seen as indirectly advocating for Russian-speaking 
minority inhabitants, which some interpreted as proof of the fact that European advisers were listening too 
much to Russian propaganda.4 The words of a nationalist Latvian MP criticizing European efforts to amend 
the citizenship law –  “we must not go so quickly to European society”, and “we have many problems in 
our state and they have to be addressed before EU and NATO membership” (Johnson 1998) – represent 
well this ambivalence at that time. This can explain the initial lack of enthusiasm about EU institutions 
among Estonian and Latvian nationals. 
As for the Russophone minorities, opinions on EU also showed a measure of ambivalence, but 
before accession expectations tended to be high. For instance, a survey conducted in 2000 as part of the 
Estonian integration monitoring report showed that while about half of the ethnic Estonian population was 
in favor of EU accession, the support among Russian-speakers reached almost two thirds (Lauristin and 
Vetik 2000, 54). Although not as impressive, subsequent pre-accession surveys confirmed high expectations 
among the Russian-speakers (Järve 2005, 7). In Latvia, two prominent Russian-speakers’ parties supported 
EU accession, which was seen as an occasion to provide a clear framework for the promotion of minority 
                                                   
4 For example a Latvian nationalist MP showed his irritation at OSCE’s pressures to liberalize minority language policies by 
referring to the OSCE High Commissioner for National Minorities as “your Van der Stoel” when talking to the Russophone 
MPs during a parliamentary debate on 29 April 1998. The transcripts of Latvian parliamentary debates can be found (in 
Latvian) at www.saeima.lv. 
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rights in the country (Zepa 2006, 115). In the words of Latvian political scientist Brigita Zepa, “EU 
citizenship offered a new chance to receive equal rights” (Zepa 2006, 108). 
After EU accession in 2004, the attitudes towards EU institutions changed for both majorities 
and minorities. With no accession conditionalities as bargaining tool, after accession the EU lost effective 
political pressure on the Estonian and Latvian governments to ease up their minority policies, including on 
citizenship, language, and education laws. In fact, already in the last period before accession it had become 
clear that accession would have not been blocked on account of the Russophone minorities’ rights, and even 
the most controversial issue (the presence in the two countries of unprecedented — for Europe — numbers 
of non-citizens) was not considered a stumbling block. This contradicted the initial strong rhetoric on 
minority rights (Hughes 2005, 751), disappointing Russophone expectations.  
In this context, EU accession was welcomed by the national elites as an authoritative seal on the 
successful consolidation of the Estonian and Latvian democracies. National elites saw the accession as 
proof that their minority policies did not need to be justified any longer (Schulze 2010, 376, 381), and 
eagerly promoted the impression that accession meant that all issues concerning the Russophone minorities 
had been solved or were on route to be solved (Sasse 2008, 849). Russophone elites were of a different 
opinion, and they typically did not see EU accession as proof that minority issues had been solved (Schulze 
2010, 381). Therefore, the conditions in which accession took place likely caused disappointment among 
the Russian-speaking minorities, and disillusionment with European institutions as guardians of minority 
rights. 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, politically active Russian-speaking minorities followed a similar downward 
trend in trust for EU institutions as the rest of their ethnic communities. The European Value Survey (EVS, 
held in 1999 and 2008 in the Baltic States) asked respondents about their confidence in the EU, their 
language background, and their experience of political activism. The results show that confidence in the 
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EU decreased among politically active5 Russian-speaking minorities after EU accession (Table 1).  
 
Table 1. Attitude toward EU of politically active Russophone minorities in 1999 and 2008. 
 
 
Source: European Values Survey 1999, 2008 
Unit: Russian-speaking minority, who have attended demonstrations in the past 
 
These results are in line with the general downward trajectory of trust among Russophone minorities, 
and were also reflected in the assessments of Russian-speaking minority activists in both Estonia and Latvia. 
Indeed, Russophone activists in both countries showed a clear understanding of the fact that European 
institutions had much less power over their governments’ minority policies after accession, and expressed 
disappointment and frustration with the post-accession situation. For example, a respondent from Latvia’s 
Non-Citizens Congress (an organization lobbying for non-citizens’ rights and an end to non-citizenship) 
recognized that  
Unfortunately, in the European Union questions of human rights – including national minority 
questions – are very weak. EU looks at these issues very closely during the accession period, 
but after that, as we can see in Hungary […], they cannot do anything apart from some weak 
political measures like boycotts and public condemnations. (Interview, Latvia, 2013). 
Other activists expressed their disillusionment with the European institutions’ capacity (and 
                                                   
5 We use respondents’ experience with political demonstrations as a proxy of respondents’ political activeness. 
1999 2008 1999 2008
A great deal 6.7% 0.0% 2.9% 4.5%
quite a lot 40.0% 39.3% 31.9% 19.4%
not very much 36.7% 35.7% 36.2% 43.3%
none at all 16.7% 25.0% 29.0% 32.8%
N 30 28 69 67
Q: How much confident in European Union?(%)
Estonia Latvia
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willingness) to push for minority policy changes in even stronger terms. Another respondent from Latvia 
complained that the EU plays “the role of the hypocrite, who in words understands the problem” but is not 
willing to do much in practice to solve it (Interview, Latvia, 2013). The same activist described in clear 
terms the change in expectations regarding a EU-driven solution to minority issues that took place among 
the Russophone minorities: ‘Many Russians voted in favor of access to the EU, I also did – hoping that the 
EU would not accept to have apartheid happening inside its borders’ (Interview, Latvia, 2013). Another 
activist from Latvia’s Non-Citizens Congress put this even more forcefully:  
Are we Europeans or not? Are we Russian-Europeans or not? […] The EU evidently does not 
consider us Europeans otherwise they would have taken care of us as they do with the rest of 
the Europeans. (Interview, Latvia, 2013) 
Several respondents claimed that the fact that recommendations on minority issues (especially 
on citizenship) did not have to be fulfilled for Estonia and Latvia to be accepted in the EU was a 
disappointment. After accession, minority activists were losing a precious ally and their domestic position 
was also weakened by the national elites’ contention that accession meant that all outstanding minority 
issues had been solved. According to a respondent from Latvia, the government refused to acknowledge 
criticism after 2004, claiming that “you accepted us into the EU; it means that you recognized that in Latvia 
everything is ok” (Interview, Latvia, 2013). An example of this disappointment in Estonia is provided by 
Vadim Poleshchuk (2009, 7), a scholar and Russophone minority civil society activist, in the foreword to 
his book on minority rights in Estonia and Latvia: “Unreceptive to the recommendations of various 
international organisations, the Estonian and Latvian administrations would have readily embraced any 
suggestions made by Brussels whenever these helped accelerate their accession to the EU. The EU, however, 
extracted little from the opportunity. Now this resource has been exhausted.” A Russophone activist in 
Estonia expressed his low expectations towards a EU-led solution to Russian-speakers’ problems in these 
terms: 
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Unfortunately the European institutions look with indifference at what happens in the country, 
in Estonia and also in Latvia. This is strange. Similar situations in other countries provoke 
some reaction but here for some reason all stays silent, nobody raises these themes… That is, 
we are confronted not with European solidarity, but with a cover up. [European institutions 
think:] “We have these bad boys, but they are our boys […] as long as there is no unrest it’s 
fine for us”. (Interview, Estonia, 2013) 
Therefore, in both Estonia and Latvia minority activists openly recognize that their initial 
expectations about the EU’s involvement in forwarding a minority rights agenda have been disappointed. 
In no case Russophone activists showed the expectation that EU institutions could (or in fact would be 
willing to) impose significant changes in minority policies onto the Estonian and Latvian governments after 
accession. This is in line with the general fall in trust in EU institutions among Estonia’s and Latvia’s 
Russian-speaking minorities. 
 
4. Trust in European Institutions and Minority Activism: A 
Puzzle? 
In the general context of disappointment with Europeanization among minority communities as 
well as minority activists, we would expect that European institutions should play little role in Russophone 
activists’ mobilization strategies. However, our statistical and qualitative data on minority political activism 
and EU trust presents a more complicated picture, which suggests that our understanding of what constitutes 
trust should be revised. Further statistical analysis reveals a somewhat unexpected positive relation between 
the level of political activism of minority members and their trust for EU institutions. We found that – 
although levels of trust have decreased among both politically active and politically inactive minority 
members – someone who belongs to the Russophone minority group and engages in political activism, 
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tends to have a more positive attitude towards European institutions, than people who do not engage in 
activism. 
This relation emerges from our regression analyses based on the European Social Survey (ESS) 
fourth module, conducted in 2009 in Estonia and Latvia.6 We concentrated our analysis on individuals, 
who answered that they use the Russian language as their mother tongue.7 The main dependent variable in 
this analysis is the respondents’ trust in the European Parliament, on a continuum from “No trust at all 
[score 0]” to “Complete trust [score 10]”. We used five indicators from the Survey to determine Russian-
speakers’ level of domestic political activism as independent variables: signing petitions in the past twelve 
months; contacting politicians or government officials in the past twelve months; working with political 
parties or other action groups in the past twelve months; taking part in lawful public demonstration in the 
past twelve months; and a feeling of closeness to a specific political party. All five indicators are coded as 
dichotomous. We also controlled for the effect of the following factors: interest in politics, citizenship status 
(non-citizen dummy), household income (decile scale), age, gender (female dummy), and educational 
level.8 In addition, by considering trust in the national parliament (also on a 11-step scale), we control the 
effect of respondents’ general trust for national decision-making bodies. This controlling makes the 
meaning of the effect of independent variables for European institutions clearer in the subsequent analysis. 
We used simple ordinary least square linear regression, with robust standard error to reduce 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation problem in our estimation..  
The results demonstrate that Russian-speaking respondents’ positive evaluations of European 
institutions have a meaningful correlation with their political actions. The respondents with the experiences 
to have participated in political activities tend to have significantly more positive opinions of the European 
                                                   
6 Unfortunately, its fifth and sixth modules were not conducted in Latvia. Then this fourth wave is the newest one for both 
countries. The seventh module will be conducted in both Latvia and Estonia, but its data have not been released yet.  
7 Questions are “[In Estonian] Millist keelt või keeli räägite kodus kõige sagedamini? [In Latvian] Kādā valodā vai valodās 
Jūs pārsvarā runājat mājās? [In Russian] На каком/ каких языках Вы в основном общаетесь дома?” 
8 Based on the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED) scale. 
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parliament than those without such political activism.. For instance, if two persons who have the same level 
of political interest, income, education, age, and gender were compared, an individual who has engaged in 
domestic political actions demonstrates a significantly higher probability to have positive perception of 
European institutions in Latvia and Estonia than someone without political activities. 
 
Table 2. The determinants of trust for Europe by Russian minorities in Estonia and Latvia 
DV= Trust for European Parliament 
 
model 1 model 2 model 1 model 2
Political interests 0.296 0.147 0.245 0.463**
(0.192) (0.169) (0.184) (0.175)
Income (decile scale) 0.00622 -0.00940 0.0290 0.00321
(0.0580) (0.0498) (0.0611) (0.0570)
Citizenship = no -0.0246 0.184 0.137 -0.0911
(0.266) (0.238) (0.317) (0.293)
Age 0.000111 -0.0101 -0.0169 -0.0151
(0.00809) (0.00723) (0.00905) (0.00840)
Gender = female 0.282 0.134 0.273 0.209
(0.258) (0.228) (0.282) (0.267)
Educational level (ISCED) -0.0636 0.0493 -0.0574 0.0178
(0.0867) (0.0776) (0.0759) (0.0704)
Contacted politician/offcials -0.515 -0.967 1.944*** 1.517***
(0.534) (0.497) (0.426) (0.437)
Signed petitions 1.488** 1.555** -0.144 0.0529
(0.522) (0.491) (0.631) (0.612)
Took part in demonstartions -0.0731 0.0857 -0.810 -0.854
(1.009) (1.012) (0.471) (0.457)
Worked in party -0.892 -0.430 0.250 -0.190
(0.989) (0.998) (1.071) (1.084)
Feel close to a particula party 0.785** 0.722** 0.447 0.326
(0.268) (0.242) (0.308) (0.289)
Trust for national partliament 0.426*** 0.507***
(0.0476) (0.0549)
Constant 4.967*** 3.351*** 4.422*** 4.337***
(1.095) (0.952) (1.047) (0.999)
N 309 303 403 401
Estonia Latvia
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* p<0.05, ** p<0.01,  *** p<0.001       
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. 
 
Figure 2. The effect of each parameter onto the trust for European parliament. 
 
Note: Each bar indicates 99% and 95% confidence intervals. If those bars cross over zero line, it means that 
we cannot say that that parameter’s effect is neither positive nor negative. 
 
Table 2 shows the results of our statistical analysis, and figure 2 visualizes each IV’s effect onto the level 
of trust for European parliament. In both countries, Russian speaking minorities who have engaged in 
political activities tend to have higher trust for European parliament, even after controlling for the effect of 
respondents’ interest in politics, age, citizenship, and other socioeconomic parameters. These effects are 
stable if we control the effect of trust for the national parliament. The type of political activities relating 
with trust for European institutions differ between Estonia and Latvia. In Estonia, the respondents who 
Political interest
Income (decile)
Non-citizen
Age
Gender = female
Educational level (ISCED)
Contacted Politicians/Officials
Signed Petition
Take part in demonstration
Worked in political party
Feel closer to a particular party
Trust in country's parliament
-4 -2 0 2 4 -4 -2 0 2 4
Estonia Latvia
model 1 model2
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signed petitions and feel close to a specific party are significantly statistically more likely to have higher 
trust for the European Parliament. At the same time, in Estonia, trust in the EU does not correlate with much 
direct political action, such as contacting politicians, and working in parties or action groups. In Latvia, 
trust in the European parliament significantly correlates with active forms of political participation, such as 
contacting politicians or government officials. Participating in public demonstration has negative 
covariance but this effect is not statistically significant. Although the kind of activities they engage with is 
different, we can say that – like in Estonia – also in Latvia Russian speakers’ positive evaluation of European 
institutions has a systematic connection with their political activism in domestic affairs.9 Interestingly, in 
both countries, citizenship status also does not have a systematic effect on trust for European institution. 
These results leave us with a puzzle. First of all, the covariance between trust in the EU and political 
activism stands in contradiction with the general trend of falling trust in European institutions among 
minority members. Are politically active Russian speakers simply a (shrinking) minority of optimists? 
Moreover, the statistical analysis reveals a strong correlation between trust in the EU and political activism, 
but cannot explain the implications of such trust. In order to shed light on these questions, we conducted 
interviews with Russophone activists to interpret qualitatively the meaning of our statistical findings.  
Before turning to our qualitative analysis, however, we will briefly highlight some of the main 
differences between Estonia and Latvia that emerged in our statistical analysis. In this study we are mostly 
interested in the common trends between the two cases and what they can tell us about minority 
mobilization and Europeanization in post-accession countries. However, differences can also shed some 
light on the contingent domestic factors that influence and modify the relationship between Europeanization 
and minority activism. 
The most important difference that emerged is that Russian-speaking minorities in Latvia tend to 
                                                   
9 In a robustness check in which we limit the unit of analysis only to Russian-speaking minorities without citizenship, we 
got similar results. One notable difference is that Russophone non-citizens who have participated in demonstrations in the 
past twelve months tend to show low trust for European parliament in Latvia.  
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connect direct political actions (contacting politicians or public administrations) with a positive evaluation 
of European institutions more often than their counterparts in Estonia. So, although in both countries 
Russophone respondents who engage in political actions in a domestic context tend to have a more positive 
evaluation of European institutions than those without political activism, Russophone residents in Latvia 
seems to choose more active strategies (e.g. lobbying) than their counterparts in Estonia (e.g. signing 
petitions, feeling close to a specific party). This difference is in line with existing analyses of minority 
activism in the two countries. Because of a combination of more resources and domestic opportunity 
structures that are more conducive to direct action (including more formal minority representation in 
domestic institutions), Latvia’s Russian speakers have generally been more politically active and better 
organized than their Estonian counterparts (Cianetti 2014a).  
At state level, in Estonia the Russian-speakers’ parties that had been created in the 1990s 
disappeared by the end of that decade, and the Russophone vote shifted mostly to the Estonian Centre Party. 
Although the Centre Party is not an ethnic minority party and its leadership is overwhelmingly ethnic 
Estonian, its liberal views about minority issues and the appeal among Russian-speakers of its controversial 
leader, Edgar Savisaar, have made the party dominant among the Russophone minority for many years 
(Jeffries 2004, 160–1; Nakai 2014). The Centre Party accounts for most of the Russophone MPs in the 
Estonian parliament, but these are still disproportionally few both compared to the size of the Russian-
speaking minority and to the size of Centre Party’s Russophone electorate. In Latvia, Russian-speakers’ 
parties have become increasingly successful over the years and they have mostly consolidated in the 
moderate ethnic party Harmony. Harmony has been electorally very successful and has become the biggest 
party in the Latvian parliament since 2011, guaranteeing the almost proportional representation of Russian-
speakers. However, although in some occasions there have been talks about including Harmony in the 
governing coalition, the party has so far always been left in the opposition, with little direct impact on 
policymaking.  
21 
 
As for local-level politics, in Estonia, the Centre Party is dominant in municipalities with large 
Russophone populations, especially the northeastern region of Ida-Virumaa and the capital city Tallinn. 
While city-level politics can provide an additional avenue for Russian-speakers’ political participation and 
mobilization, the advantages of this in terms of minority empowerment are disputable and Savisaar’s 
mayorship of Tallinn often resembles patronage rather than minority representation (Cianetti 2014b).10 In 
Latvia, Harmony has gained power in Riga since 2009, and its leader Nils Ušakovs has been the first 
Russophone mayor of the capital city. While in the short term this does not provide any guarantees for 
minority voices to have an effective impact on national policymaking, Ušakovs’s mayorship has an 
important symbolic meaning for Latvia’s Russophone minority and might in the longer term normalize the 
presence of Russian-speakers in position of power (Cianetti 2014b). 
As for other, non-institutional ways to influence policymaking, the development of an active civil 
society in Latvia and Estonia is quite limited among both majorities and minorities (Bartkowsky and 
Jasińska-Kania 2004; Heidmets 2008, 59–61; Rozenvalds 2005, 140 ff.; Rozenvalds 2007, 91), a feature 
that they share with most post-communist countries (Howard 2003; Kostelka 2014). However, the 
Russophone civil society has been particularly weak and demobilized in Estonia, whereas in Latvia it has 
shown more pronounced mobilization and organizational capacities (Table 3).  
 
                                                   
10 It is important to note that, differently from Latvia, in Estonia non-citizens and third country nationals (which constitute 
about half of Estonia’s Russophone population) have the right to vote in local elections. 
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Table 3. The Proportion of Residents who have participated in political activism (2009). 
 
Source: European Social Survey, fourth module. 
 
Reasons for the inability of Estonia’s Russian-speakers to consistently act as a collective force 
are multiple. Most often observers have highlighted the fact that the group is not ethnically homogenous, 
that Russian-speakers arrived in Estonia in different waves of immigration, that they tend to have a weak 
sense of roots, and that they are mostly urbanized which adds to their atomization (Daatland and Svege 
2000, 260; Poleshchuk 2009, 17). These characteristics, however, apply also to Latvia, where they did not 
bring to the same results. Lower political participation among Estonia’s Russian-speakers might be linked 
to their lower average socio-economic status, and thus fewer socio-economic resources in Estonia’s 
Russophone community than in Latvia’s.11 The higher level of minority formal representation and the 
success of Russian-speakers’ parties in Latvia might also contribute in enhancing Latvia’s Russian-speakers’ 
capacities for mobilization. 
Beyond these differences, the statistical analysis presents a puzzle: while trust on European 
institutions is falling throughout the minority communities (as shown in the previous section), minority 
members who are politically active still retain a higher trust than their non-active counterparts. This is 
surprising, as these are the people who have the higher chances of having engaged with European 
institutions and of having been disappointed by the scarce results. The following section rests on qualitative, 
                                                   
11 Ethnic-based socio-economic inequality is more pronounced in Estonia than in Latvia (Rozenvalds 2007, 37). 
country
language
group
Russian (citizen)
(non-
citizen)
Estonian Russian (citizen)
(non-
citizen)
Latvian
Contacted politician or government
official last 12 months
6.17% 7.32% 4.92% 13.08% 10.82% 11.04% 10.50% 12.50%
Worked in political party or action
group last 12 months
1.49% 1.96% 1.14% 3.57% 1.22% 1.19% 1.27% 1.22%
Signed petition last 12 months 4.26% 3.00% 3.79% 9.42% 5.95% 8.08% 2.95% 5.41%
Taken part in lawful public
demonstration last 12 months
2.13% 2.45% 1.89% 1.91% 9.95% 8.93% 11.39% 5.76%
Estonia Latvia
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in-depth interviews with Russophone activists in Estonia and Latvia, in order to provide a deeper insight 
on this seeming paradox. In particular, we want to understand how politically active Russian-speakers have 
negotiated the post-accession disillusionment with European institutions. 
 
5. Russophone activists after EU accession 
Our statistical model shows that politically active Russian-speakers tend to have a higher trust in European 
institutions, which seems at odds with the general declining trust in the EU among the minorities. Our 
interviews with minority activists confirm both the trend of falling trust and the persistent connection 
between political activism and trust in the EU. They also reveal, however, something that would otherwise 
remain undetected in the quantitative analysis: that the quality of minority activists’ trust for the EU has 
changed significantly over time.  
As shown above, the minority activists we interviewed are deeply disappointed with European 
institutions and have no expectation that these institutions are capable (or even willing) to intervene directly 
to improve minority rights in Estonia and Latvia. This change in expectations, however, does not mean that 
minority activists abandoned European institutions as a potential (or even key) arena to promote their 
domestic agendas. First of all, most activists still made reference to “European values” as the basis for their 
domestic claims. In fact, their own criticism of the European institutions is based on the fact that the EU 
acted according to other strategic priorities rather than following its own values of minority recognition and 
human rights. What most activists reproach the EU for are its “hypocritical” approach and its “double 
standards”. In the words of a Russophone activist: “How long can they go on recommending? These 
recommendations must eventually be fulfilled otherwise all is meaningless!” (Interview, Latvia, 2013). In 
general, notwithstanding the disappointment with European institutions, European values and the language 
of minority rights promoted as part of European integration still provide useful rhetorical and moral tools 
for minority activists to justify their demands and inform their political actions. This shows that there is no 
24 
 
contradiction in our statistical results: European institutions have disappointed early minority expectations 
— hence the general fall of trust among minority respondents — but still provide useful tools and a strong 
moral basis to advance minority demands, hence the higher recognition of European institutions among 
politically active minority members.  
The most important trait that emerges from the interviews is that the consistently low expectations 
on the EU’s willingness to do anything in practice to promote minority agendas in Estonia and Latvia is not 
followed by an abandonment of European institutions as an important arena for minority mobilization. On 
the contrary, falling trust in the EU is accompanied by the pragmatic recognition that European institutions 
can still be a useful arena to make minority agendas visible and to legitimate them domestically. And this 
goes beyond the internalization and use of minority rights and human rights discourses. Minority activists 
do not limit themselves to using references to “European values”, but also actively lobby European 
institutions to recognize their minority demands as legitimate. This, however, is done not with the 
expectation that European institutions have the power to influence domestic legislation on minorities or 
would even be willing to intervene on behalf of Russophone minorities. Rather, European institutions are 
framed by Russophone activists as an important tool (albeit not the only one) to put pressure on domestic 
actors.  
While this did not result in a significant shift in the kind of activities minority activists engage in 
on the European arena, it signals an important change in minority activists’ understanding of such arena. In 
other words, there is little expectation for a EU-led solution: the solution is domestic, the tool (or, rather, 
one of the tools) is European. This strategy was described clearly by a Russophone activist in Latvia, 
according to whom the EU cannot do much to change Latvia’s minority policies: 
But we can use its lobbying mechanisms, so we actively talk with the EU press in English and 
French in order to put this problem on the agenda, in order to put pressure on our domestic 
politicians. […] Therefore, the question itself remains domestic, and our international 
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activities are linked with strengthening the pressure on the Latvian government, and also to 
make it so that this question enters also the Latvian information space. (Interview, Latvia, 
2013) 
Similarly, according to another activist: “The significance of the EU is not that high, but it’s one of the 
means to exert political influence domestically” (Interview, Latvia, 2013). 
In the interviews, as with the statistical data, a difference between Estonia and Latvia emerged in 
terms of Russophone activism. While Russophone activists in Estonia described a similar change in their 
expectations regarding European institutions as their counterparts in Latvia, they appeared to have fewer 
actual contacts with European institutions and thus their appeals to “European values” were less embedded 
in concrete EU-level strategies. This could be partially due to the fact that Russophone organizations in 
Estonia have fewer resources, which makes it more difficult to develop a more expensive international 
strategy. It can also be linked to the fact that Russophone minority activists in Latvia can count on the 
support and access offered by a Russophone MEP, Tatijana Ždanoka, from the Russophone ethnic party For 
Human Rights in a United Latvia (renamed Latvia’s Russian Union in 2014), a party that is not represented 
in the Latvian parliament but has been able to secure a seat in the European Parliament since 2004. Ždanoka 
has been active in promoting Russian-speakers’ issues in the European Parliament and was often mentioned 
by our Russophone activists respondents from Latvia as a resource they could use to get access to EU 
discussion forums. The election of the Russophone Yana Toom from the Estonian Centre Party in the last 
European elections in 2014 may come to play a similar role for Estonia’s minority activists. 
Notwithstanding differences in terms of resources and levels of activism, in both Estonia and 
Latvia minority activists responded to the changed role of EU institutions on minority rights after accession 
by readjusting their expectations and rethinking their strategies. While there has been no significant change 
in the quantity (relatively low) and to some extent the form of minority mobilization on the European arena, 
the quality and meaning of such mobilization have changed. Therefore, while politically active Russian-
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speakers might have a higher level of recognition of European institutions, there has been a significant 
change in the quality of activists’ trust in European institutions, which goes hand in hand with the 
quantitative decrease in general trust in the EU among Russian-speakers.  
Our qualitative data show that a more positive evaluation of European institutions does not per 
se cause more activism. Rather, Estonia and Latvia’s minority activists share the same evaluations as the 
rest of the Russophone minorities regarding EU institutions’ willingness and capability to “do something” 
about minority rights. Therefore, activists are not a shrinking minority of incurable optimists: they 
consistently show a clear understanding of the limits of the EU and have no expectations for a EU-led 
solution to minority grievances. At the same time, however, they can be said to still trust the EU in the sense 
that their low expectations for what European institutions can and will do does not cancel out for them the 
possibility to use EU institutions, norms and discourses as political tools. Activists still consider European 
institutions as a relevant arena for mobilization and use Europeanization discourses about minority rights, 
human rights and the more nebulous “European values” as moral and normative support for their political 
claims. 
The interviews suggest, therefore, that – in a context of generalized disenchantment with the EU 
as promoter of minority rights – activists’ trust in the EU remained higher but changed in quality. If before 
EU accession this trust, as admitted by several interviewed activists, rested on high expectations about the 
European institutions’ active promotion of minority rights, the post-accession trust is significantly more 
critical.  
Two elements can be distinguished in this “critical trust”: one rests in the political pragmatism of 
minority activists, and the other in their European socialization. Firstly, activists pragmatically use 
European institutions as relevant arenas for minority activism. European institutions became a fundamental 
part of the political opportunity structures for minority activism soon after Estonia and Latvia’s 
independence, and remain so also after accession. In a context of domestic political marginalization, 
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minority activists habitually use European venues to put pressure on domestic governments and to gain 
media visibility. Activists described their strategy as “shaming” their own governments on the European 
stage in order to gain political currency domestically, hence the strategic focus on media visibility. “Naming 
and shaming” has been recognized as a key tool in organizations and movements’ repertoire to promote 
human rights from external (international) platforms (Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 2013; Friman 2015; 
Lebovic and Voeten 2006; Meernik et al. 2012). Russian-speaking minority activists seem to have opted 
for this strategy in a context in which they confront limited political space domestically and decreasing 
support from European institutions. They sign petitions to European institutions, promote debates with 
European Parliament groups, participate in international conferences, and hold meetings in Brussels.12 As 
their national governments are still strongly invested in the European integration process, they expect that 
shaming them in the European arena might – if nothing else – at least catch their attention. The success of 
this strategy will depend on contingent domestic factors, such as resources, the specific dynamics of 
domestic political debates and their relative openness or closure. However, it is clear that, given the 
marginalization of minority political voices domestically, activists still see European institutions as 
providing at least a potential avenue for inclusion. 
A second element of the activists’ critical trust in European institutions has less to do with their 
pragmatic considerations and more with their socialization within the general (if somewhat vague) 
framework of “European values”. These values offer a tool to legitimate minority demands against 
prevalent nationalizing discourses in the domestic political arena. The fact that minority activists uphold 
such values even in the context of falling trust for European institutions, suggests that Europeanization still 
holds a strong (if indirect) effect on minorities. While European institutions have mostly retreated from 
Estonia and Latvia’s domestic debates on minority rights, their previous involvement and, in fact, their very 
                                                   
12 For example, Latvia’s Congress of Non-Citizens held a series of meetings and talks in Brussels in August 2013 and then 
organized a small sit-in action near the European Parliament in November 2013 (Latvian Centre for Human Rights 5 
August 2013, 29 November 2013). 
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existence still has relevant indirect effects on minority mobilization. Since independence, minority activists 
have (more or less successfully) attempted to lobby European institutions and have participated in political 
debates in which European norms and values take center stage. These interactions functioned as processes 
of socialization for minority activists, who internalized European norms but also learned to critically engage 
with European institutions. In this sense, the shaming strategy is also directed towards the European 
institutions, which are reminded of minorities’ pre-accession expectations and of their own promises. 
 
6. Conclusion 
Our study shows the importance of looking at the European Union (and international institutions in general) 
not only from the perspective of whether they are effective in pushing through certain minority policies, 
but also in terms of their indirect effects on minorities and their political mobilization. The literatures on 
compliance with European norms on minorities and on socialization tend to treat minorities as the objects 
of minority policies, focusing on the relationship and negotiations between majority elites and European 
institutions. Our study adds to this picture by focusing on minorities and asking how minority communities 
responded to the reduced emphasis on minority rights by European institutions after Estonia and Latvia’s 
EU accession. We also contribute to the debate on the international (European) dimension of opportunity 
structures, showing how minority actors can respond to changing opportunities. 
We found that positive evaluations of European institutions have declined significantly among 
Russian speakers, both among activists and the general minority population. At the same time, Russian-
speaking activists display what we called a “critical trust” towards the EU. That is, they share their 
communities’ disillusionment with European institutions’ capacity and willingness to do something about 
minority rights in Estonia and Latvia, but this is not accompanied by the abandonment of the “European 
route” to pursuing minority agendas. On the contrary, activists still perceive the EU as an important political 
tool and also as a moral reference point for minority political activism.  
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In this sense, activists’ “critical trust” in European institutions can be understood as a function of 
their European socialization, and so as an indirect effect of Europeanization. “Europe” offers valuable 
discursive tools to minority activists to justify and legitimate their own demands within a wider European 
discourse on human and minority rights. Once framed in those terms, minority grievances acquire a 
European dimension and European institutions become a natural arena for minority mobilization. At the 
same time, activists recognize the limitations of such arena (which they blame on the EU’s “hypocrisy”) 
and therefore they do not base their activism (for example, lobbying at the European level) on the 
expectation that European institutions will be able (or willing) to do something. Rather, they see creating 
European-level resonance on minority issues as a way of shaming domestic governments and increasing 
visibility in domestic media. In this sense, European institutions are seen pragmatically as offering 
additional tools for minority activists to enter domestic debates on minority policies.  
The “critical trust” displayed by Estonia and Latvia’s minority activists is in line with the 
literature on the indirect effects of Europeanization that sees domestic actors as not simply absorbing 
European norms, but adapting them and actively responding to changing opportunities and circumstances. 
Our study adds to that literature by highlighting the ways in which minority activists (and not only majority 
elites) respond to the changing pressures of Europeanization. Estonia and Latvia are unique cases, in 
particular given the size of their minorities and the number of non-citizens among them. Even so, we expect 
a similar “critical trust” effect to be displayed by other minority rights activists across Central and Eastern 
Europe (CEE), especially given the fact that minorities across the region shared the same initial high 
expectations on European institutions as Russian-speakers in Estonia and Latvia. While majority–minority 
data are more elusive for other CEE countries, 13  there is reason to expect that a similar trend of 
                                                   
13 Pre-accession barometer data (CCEB and CEEB) show that in countries such as Slovakia, Romania, and Lithuania 
minorities tended to have a high trust towards European institutions. Unfortunately, these countries’ datasets from post-
accession years (Eurobarometer) do not make a distinction between minorities and majorities, as the question about their 
mother-tongue was dropped, which makes it impossible to verify similar downward trends in European trust in these 
countries. 
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disappointment emerged there as well.14 Moreover, our regression analysis found that Russian-speakers’ 
citizenship status in Estonia and Latvia – which could constitute a significant comparative difference with 
other CEE countries – does not directly affect their trust toward European institutions. This reinforces our 
expectation that trends observed in Estonia and Latvia are shared with the other CEE countries.15 
More widely, our findings serve as a warning to other researchers that trust statistics cannot be 
taken at face value, as they might hide a more complex reality. Indeed, a superficial analysis of trust 
statistics risks hiding the complex structure of trust among minorities. In-depth analysis is needed to 
uncover the ways in which not only the quantity of trust towards institutions can change but also its quality. 
 
  
 
Appendix: Descriptive statistics of ESS4 
Russian speakers in Estonia 
  
                                                   
14 Cf. studies of pre- and post-accession minority rights in other CEE countries (Spirova 2012; Agarin and Brosig 2009; 
Szöcsik 2012), as well as Myra Waterbury’s contribution in this Special Issue.  
15 At the same time, there might be differences about what type of activism correlates with minorities’ perceptions of 
European institutions. For example, while our analysis demonstrates that participating in public demonstrations by 
minorities did not have substantial effects on their formation of (dis)trust for European institutions in Estonia and Latvia, 
this does not imply that the same must be true for all the other CEE countries as well. For example, for the importance of 
public demonstrations for democracy in Slovakia and Romania, see Sherrill Stroschein (2012).  
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Trust for European Parliament 389 4.77 2.31 0.00 10.00
Contacted Politicians/Officials 470 0.06 0.24 0.00 1.00
Signed Petition 469 0.04 0.20 0.00 1.00
Feel Close to Specific Party 448 0.44 0.50 0.00 1.00
Worked in Party/Action Group 469 0.01 0.12 0.00 1.00
Took part in Demonstrations 469 0.02 0.14 0.00 1.00
Trust for National Parliament 452 3.10 2.60 0.00 10.00
Political Interest 466 2.29 0.83 1.00 4.00
Household Income 389 5.28 2.49 1.00 10.00
Citizenship Status (2=No) 471 1.56 0.50 1.00 2.00
Age 472 49.32 19.07 15.00 89.00
Gender (2=female) 472 1.59 0.49 1.00 2.00
Educational Level 471 3.77 1.57 1.00 7.00
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Russian speakers in Latvia  
  
 
 
 
 
  
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Trust for European Parliament 519 3.99 2.87 0.00 10.00
Contacted Politicians/Officials 573 0.11 0.31 0.00 1.00
Signed Petition 571 0.06 0.24 0.00 1.00
Feel Close to Specific Party 557 0.32 0.47 0.00 1.00
Worked in Party/Action Group 573 0.01 0.11 0.00 1.00
Took part in Demonstrations 573 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00
Trust fro National Parliament 563 1.88 2.28 0.00 10.00
Political Interest 569 2.24 0.75 1.00 4.00
Household Income 470 4.54 2.43 1.00 10.00
Citizenship Status (2=No) 576 1.42 0.49 1.00 2.00
Age 576 50.03 17.77 16.00 88.00
Gender (2=female) 576 1.59 0.49 1.00 2.00
Educational Level 576 3.88 1.79 1.00 7.00
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